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11 Introduction
The incidence and nature of downward wage rigidities varies markedly across countries.
In the US, an ample literature suggests that workers resist nominal wage cuts (e.g. Kahn
(1997), Altonji and Devereux (2000) and Lebow et al. (2003)). In contrast, downward
nominal wage rigidities (DNWR) are lower in Europe, where real rigidities, introduced
through diﬀerent forms of explicit or implicit indexation of wages to prices, appear to
be more relevant (Dickens et al., 2007).
An important aspect that has not been addressed in the empirical micro literature
is whether downward wage rigidities represent a structural feature of the economy, in
the sense of Lucas (1976). Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996), in their discussion of
Akerlof et al. (1996) argue that the wage setting behavior of workers and ﬁrms is likely
to change in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. In particular,
workers facing long periods of low inﬂation or price stability may get used to reductions
in nominal wages, and hence oﬀer less resistance to nominal cuts. A similar argument,
in the context of the extent of wage-price indexation, is put forward by Bernanke (2004),
who claims that explicit or implicit indexation clauses should ultimately depend on the
monetary policy regime.
Previous empirical evidence suggests that wage rigidities are highly persistent within
countries. Goette et al. (2007) show that workers’ resistance to nominal wage cuts
remains persistently high in Switzerland, in spite of a prolonged period of very low
inﬂation. Studies by Barwell and Schweitzer (2007) in the UK, Bauer et al. (2007)
in Germany, and Devicienti et al. (2007) in Italy show that real rigidities are more
important than workers’ resistance to nominal wage cuts in Europe. Moreover, the
incidence of downward real wage rigidity in the three countries changes little over time.
Hence, it is not surprising that macro models featuring nominal wage rigidities and
partial indexation clauses (e.g., Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007)) treat
these parameters as ﬁxed, independent of the macro and policy framework. However,
previous empirical evidence may not be the best suited to study the question at hand; i.e.,
whether wage setting patterns vary with the macroeconomic environment. The macro
and policy environment in the countries and periods previously studied were relatively
2stable, oﬀering little variation to identify the impacts on wage setting of macro and policy
changes.
This paper contributes to this debate by documenting the case of two countries in
which the intensity of downward nominal wage rigidity and the indexation of nominal
wages has varied dramatically with the economic and institutional environment. We
study two middle-income countries, Brazil and Uruguay, both of which successfully re-
duced inﬂation after the introduction of stabilization policies in the 1990s -moving from
three-digit levels (four, in Brazil) in the ﬁrst years of the stabilization eﬀort to one-digit
levels by the end of the decade (see ﬁgure 1). Our period of analysis begins in the transi-
tion years -1995 in Brazil and 1996 in Uruguay. The movement from a high and volatile
inﬂation environment to a low inﬂation regime allows us to assess how the structural
features of wage setting changed with the macroeconomic environment.
While the two countries both experienced a transition in their rates of inﬂation, they
diﬀer in several institutional dimensions that render a comparative study interesting,
and may turn out to be important for the prevalence of diﬀerent types of rigidities.
Regarding the monetary policy framework, Uruguay is characterized during most of the
sample period by a system of exchange rate anchor, and then, after the crisis of 2002,
by moving towards a ﬂexible exchange rate regime coupled with overall price stability
within a target rate. In Brazil, by contrast, there is a sharp regime shift during the period,
with the adoption of inﬂation targeting in 1999. Two diﬀerences in the labor market
institutions of the two countries are also important. First, unions in Uruguay steadily
lose power while ﬁrm level bargaining gains weight dramatically during the sample period
(Senatore-Camerota, 2007); while in Brazil extension clauses result in high and stable
union coverage rates (Arbache, 2002). Second, minimum wages in Uruguay are not
binding, whereas in Brazil, workers earning a minimum wage represent 6.9 percent of
the formal labor force in our sample. In most Latin American countries, however, changes
in the minimum wage tend to be used as a signal for wage bargaining across all sectors
(Maloney and Mendez, 2004). In this respect, such changes might be an important source
of indexation in Brazil.
This paper also contributes to an understanding of the evolution of wage rigidities
3in micro-data for emerging countries, a topic that has received very little attention in
the literature.1 We rely on high-quality matched employer-employee data from admin-
istrative records in Brazil and Uruguay, which allows us to obtain accurate measures of
wages and to properly track worker mobility. The analysis is carried out using the max-
imum likelihood estimator ﬁrst proposed by Altonji and Devereux (2000), and extended
to consider DRWR by Goette et al. (2007). The estimator relies on a model of wage
changes that jointly estimates the relevant parameters governing the process of DNWR
and wage indexation. Importantly, the price index underlying the indexation process is
endogenously determined by the model and allowed to be heterogeneous across workers.
This permits ex-post evaluation of the relationship between this price index and diﬀerent
prices in the economy, which is crucial for understanding the sources of indexation. The
model also allows for errors in the measurement of wages. This is potentially important,
since measurement error in wage data has been shown to be a source of downward bias
in studies of DNWR (Gottschalk, 2005).
Our results indicate that Brazil and Uruguay present substantial diﬀerences in the
nature of wage rigidities, and in their reaction to changes in the macroeconomic and
institutional environment. In the private formal sector of Uruguay, the pegging of indi-
vidual nominal wage growth to the rate of inﬂation falls dramatically over the sample
period. Downward real wage rigidity aﬀects on average 75 percent of the workforce in
the period 1996-1999, reducing to a fairly stable 7 percent for the rest of the sample
period (1999-2004). In parallel, the fraction of workers subject to DNWR increases from
around 13 percent in the ﬁrst three years to an average of 66 percent in the second part
of the sample. Hence, disinﬂation is associated with a sharp movement away from wage
indexation. However, this process does not lead the way to a frictionless wage setting
regime. Instead, worker resistance to nominal wage cuts arises.
In contrast with Uruguay, the incidence of wage indexation in Brazil is fairly high and
1A notable exception is Castellanos et al. (2004), who study downward nominal wage rigidity and
indexation to the minimum wage in Mexico. Our paper diﬀers from this study in three aspects. First, we
allow for the presence of measurement errors in the estimation, an aspect that has received considerable
attention in the literature in the last few years. Second, we do not impose wage indexation to follow
a pre-determined price index. Instead, the price index considered in wage negotiations is allowed to be
heterogeneous across agents, and is endogenously determined. Finally, our model is estimated year by
year in order to track changes in the distribution of wage changes over time.
4stable, aﬀecting on average 43 percent of the workforce. There is, however, an important
regime shift underway in Brazil, and this change is related to the price index to which
nominal wages are indexed. During the ﬁrst years of the sample, up to 1999, the price
index to which wages are indexed is the change in the minimum wage. Subsequently,
and coincident with the introduction of inﬂation targeting in 1999, the price index that
represents the focal point of wage negotiations moves away from the minimum wage and
becomes closely related to the evolution inﬂation. Interestingly, the variance of this price
index across agents also increases after 1999 -a feature that is consistent with the index
being an indicator of inﬂation expectations.
The results in this paper are related to two recent macro studies. In the context
of price setting, Benati (2008) shows that the rate of inﬂation persistence in diﬀerent
countries and time periods varies with the monetary policy regime, while Hofmann et al.
(2010) show similar time variation in US wage dynamics. These two papers oﬀer com-
pelling time series evidence that challenges the notion that the persistence of inﬂation,
or wage indexation to past inﬂation, are intrinsic to the deep structure of the economy,
and invariant to changes in the monetary regime. Our work is a ﬁrst attempt to examine
the stability of downward nominal and real wage rigidities in an environment subject to
policy changes and rapid macroeconomic stabilization. To this end, relying on matched
establishment-worker data constitutes a great advantage. A general problem with the
aggregation in macro series is that it assumes that the evolution of wage rigidities is
the same for all establishments or groups of individuals. However, agents with diﬀerent
characteristics are likely to react diﬀerently to macro and policy changes. Some of these
are subtle changes. For instance, our results for Brazil show that after the introduction of
inﬂation targeting some agents appear to start negotiating wage changes as a function of
expected inﬂation, while others remain pegged to changes in the minimum wage. Under-
standing the evolution of the focal point of wage negotiations is important for the design
of monetary policy, and to guide the need for possible structural reforms in the labor
market. However, these changes may be blurred by aggregation at the macro level. The
use of micro data instead allows us to examine time-varying worker and establishment
heterogeneity in wage setting.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets used
and presents wage change histograms for selected years, discussing their main features
and why they are suggestive of diﬀerent types of rigidities. Section 3 discusses the
methodology used to deal with measurement errors and the joint estimation of the dif-
ferent types of rigidity. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper. In section 5
we extend the analysis of the incidence of wage rigidities to diﬀerentiate across worker
and ﬁrm characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
We use annual administrative employer-employee matched data from Brazil (1995-2002)
and Uruguay (1996-2004). The main diﬀerence between the two data sets is that while
the former is comprehensive, including information for the universe of workers in the
formal sector in Brazil, the latter provides us with information on a random sample of
workers in Uruguay’s formal sector.
Our data source for Brazil is the labor market census RAIS (Relação Annual de
Informações Sociais), an administrative data set collected annually by the Brazilian
Labor Ministry. By Brazilian law, all employers in the formal sector must report de-
tailed information for all their workers to RAIS every year. RAIS includes information
about workers (sex, age, education) and their jobs (type of contract, occupation, aver-
age monthly wage earned during the year, wage earned in December, and the amount
of hours usually worked per week), as well as some characteristics of the establishment
(sector, region, municipality). Importantly, RAIS also provides ﬁrm, establishment, and
worker identiﬁers which, together with the dates of admission and separation, allow us
to accurately identify year-to-year job stayers.
We restrict our Brazilian sample to the state of Minas Gerais. We do so for two
reasons. First, using the whole RAIS sample, which is huge, would make data handling
impracticable. Second, we have conﬁrmed, using representative survey data, that Minas
Gerais is well suited to represent the Brazilian economy. In particular, our tabulations,
6based on the Brazilian Labor Force Survey “Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego” for our sample
years indicate that the shares of formal employment, gender, age, and industry distri-
bution in Belo Horizonte (the capital of Minas Gerais) is very similar to those in other
urban areas (see table 1).2
Our Uruguayan data consist of social security records from the Banco de Previsión
Social (BPS). After the 1995 social security reform, the BPS started keeping employer
and employee administrative records on a monthly basis. We exploit a random sample of
the BPS records, which, like the Brazilian RAIS, contains information on establishments
(number of employees, sector, region), workers (age, sex) and their jobs (occupation,
weekly hours of work, monthly wages). Establishments and workers are uniquely tracked
by an individual identiﬁer and an establishment identiﬁer. Each job within a worker-
establishment pair is uniquely identiﬁed as well, which allows us to track year-to-year job
stayers who have been neither promoted nor demoted. This job identiﬁer, however, is not
available in the Brazilian RAIS, so for the sake of comparability in our empirical analysis
we deﬁne stayers as workers who are continuously employed in the same establishment
for a year or more.3
Regarding the compensation measures used in our analysis, the Brazilian RAIS re-
ports monthly wages earned in December, which include extraordinary additions, sup-
plements and bonuses, tips and gratuities, commissions and fees, contracted premia,
overtime compensation for contracted extra hours, and, in general, all forms of pay-
ment that are taxable income or are subject to Brazilian social security contributions.
The “thirteenth salary” -the special December payment that is made in some sectors-
as well as severance payments for layoﬀs and indemnity payments are not considered
wage components. Therefore, we construct a comparable monthly wage measure from
Uruguay’s BPS that excludes severance payments and the special December payment.
The number of hours worked per week is reported in both data sets. There are some
2The Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego is representative of urban areas in 8 districts of Brazil. We restrict
the comparison to Belo Horizonte, where, according to our data, 28 percent of formal employees in Minas
Gerais are employed.
3However, it is worth noting that our results are very similar when we exclude promoted or demoted
employees from our Uruguayan sample of stayers. These resuls are available upon request from the
authors.
7diﬀerences, though, in the way hours are measured in each data set. The RAIS data
reports contractual hours, while the BPS records actual hours worked during the week
of reference.
Hourly wages in each data set are constructed using the compensation and hours
worked in that data set. Note that none of our measures of hourly wages is, in principle,
exempted from measurement errors. Since individuals’ working time arrangements are
not time invariant, even if they stay in the same job, some of the observed monthly wage
changes will actually reﬂect changes in labor input. Computing hourly wages from RAIS
will only partially mitigate this problem as long as changes in hours are reﬂected in the
contract. The hourly wage measure in Uruguay might be more accurate, but variations
in weekly hours of work throughout the month will result in measurement errors. In
conclusion, even if our two data sources are less likely to be subject to measurement
error than survey data, we cannot rule out the possibility of error. Hence, the model
described in section 3 allows for the presence of measurement error in the estimation.
For both Brazil and Uruguay, we use the same sample selection criteria. First,
we restrict our sample to full-time employees working in the private sector. Second,
whenever individuals have more than one job, we always keep the observation with
the highest paying job. Finally, our benchmark analysis of individual wage growth,
which we deﬁne as the diﬀerence in log wages over a 12-month interval, is limited to job
stayers, who are characterized by working in the same establishment in the same month
in two adjacent years. These data restrictions leave 7 years of wage change observations
in Brazil, containing between 857,589 and 1,200,120 individual cases, and 8 years in
Uruguay, including between 68,494 and 97,721 individual wage changes.
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
In order to get an initial impression of the diﬀerent types of rigidities that prevail under
diﬀerent inﬂation scenarios, we look in this section at individual wage change distrib-
utions from selected years (ﬁgures 2 and 3). In line with our previous discussion, we
concentrate on the yearly nominal log-wage change distribution of private sector work-
ers staying in the same job for two consecutive years. Each bin contains a one-percent
8variation in wages, and we have restricted nominal wage changes to be below 40 percent
and above -10 percent in the ﬁgures, in order to highlight the distortions associated with
DNWR and indexation. Two vertical lines are also shown in the graph. The solid line
is the yearly inﬂation rate, while the dashed line shows the yearly growth rate of the
minimum wage.
We start by discussing the earlier period in our sample, when inﬂation had already
started coming down but was still at double-digit levels. Panel A of ﬁgure 2 shows
the wage change histogram in 1997-1998 in Uruguay. This is the ﬁrst year of moder-
ate (10.81%) inﬂation after the introduction of the stabilization plan in 1990. The ﬁrst
notable aspect is a concentration of observations at zero wage changes (around 7 per-
cent), and the relatively little mass below it, in what seems to be a sign of downward
nominal wage rigidities. There is another important asymmetry in the distribution: a
large mass of observations is clustered around the inﬂation rate, while the percentage of
workers with a wage change right below the 10-11 percent bin is clearly lower than the
percentage of wage changes above it. Naturally, economic agents do not necessarily have
the same expectations about inﬂation, or the same reference value in wage negotiations.
Hence, the distortion associated with indexation clauses cannot be seen as sharply in
the histograms as the impact of the zero wage change boundary. This will be taken into
account in the empirical analysis by allowing for inﬂation expectations or focal point in
wage negotiations to diﬀer across agents. However, the cluster of observations around
the rate of inﬂation might be a sign of partial indexation clauses. Finally, note also that
the growth of the minimum wage lies well above the rate of inﬂation, and there are no
signs of distortion in this part of the distribution. As we will see, this is in sharp contrast
with what is happening in Brazil during this period.
Panel B of ﬁgure 2 shows the wage change histogram in 1995-1996 in Brazil. This
is right after the introduction of the stabilization plan in 1994, the Real Plan, which
succeeded in sharply bringing down inﬂation from 2,075 percent in 1993-1994 to 15.75
percent in 1995-1996. The ﬁrst noticeable aspect is a large spike in the 12 percent bin,
which accounts for some 15 percent of the wage change observations and more than
triples the mass in the adjacent bins. The 12 percent bin coincides with the growth of
9the minimum wage (11.99 percent), and forcefully suggests that the price index used to
index wage contracts this year is the change in the minimum wage. Note also that there
are no distortions associated with the rate of inﬂation. Quite surprisingly, we ﬁnd very
little zero wage changes, but the -1 bin shows a small spike. This concentration of tiny
wage cuts is suggestive of measurement error.
We move next to the low-inﬂation years. Panel A of ﬁgure 3 shows the wage change
distribution in Uruguay in 2000-2001, when inﬂation is at its low for the period (4.35
percent). The most striking feature with respect to the high-inﬂation year is the growth
in the spike at zero, which now accounts for almost 25 percent of the wage change
observations. As before, there is some concentration of observations around the rate of
inﬂation, but to a much lesser extent than in 1997-1998. Panel B of ﬁgure 3 shows the
1999-2000 histogram in Brazil. As before, the change in the minimum wage is associated
with a large spike, amounting to 14 percent of the wage changes. The novelty is that
there appears to be a second distortion in the positive wage change range, this time
associated with the rate of inﬂation. This could indicate that as inﬂation comes down,
some agents start indexing their wages to expected inﬂation.
In sum, visual inspection of the wage change histograms suggests an important pres-
ence of downward rigidities and indexation in both countries in all years. However,
obtaining precise measures of downward wage rigidities is complicated because of the
presence of measurement error in the data and the existence of diﬀerent focal points for
wage indexation. The next section presents a model that deals with these two features
and provides us with clean measures of DNWR and the extent of wage indexation.
3 Methodology
There are diﬀerent approaches in the literature to estimating rigidities from individual
worker data.4 Focusing on job stayers between two consecutive years, a number of studies
draw inferences about rigidities based on asymmetries in the wage change distribution
(see, e.g., Card and Hyslop (1997) and Dickens et al. (2007)). A second group of estimates
4Using industry data, Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) study the
incidence of DRWR and DNWR, respectively, in developed countries.
10is based on the assumption that, in the absence of changes in the extent of rigidity, the
shape of the wage change distribution is constant over time.5 A problem with these
methods is that they do not directly take into account the impact of measurement errors.
An alternative is ﬁrst proposed by Altonji and Devereux (2000), who develop a wage-
setting model in which the structural parameters of DNWR and measurement errors
are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood. This methodology has been extended by
Goette et al. (2007) to consider downward real wage rigidities (DRWR) or the resistance
of nominal wages to falling below an estimated positive threshold, , and has been applied
in the UK by Barwell and Schweitzer (2007), in Germany by Bauer et al. (2007), and in
Italy by Devicienti et al. (2007). In what follows we present a brief description of the
main elements of this model.
Each individual wage change observation can belong to one of three regimes: a regime
subject to DNWR, a regime subject to wage indexation or DRWR, and a regime in
which wages are fully ﬂexible.6 In the model we allow for the possibility (although this
is not imposed) that observed wage changes are distorted by measurement error. Deﬁne
∆y∗
it as the notional wage change distribution at time t, corresponding to wage changes
between t and t−1. The notional is the distribution that would prevail if all wages were
fully ﬂexible and there were no measurement errors. Then, the notional wage change
for a random draw i from the population can be modelled as a function of observable
characteristics, as follows:
∆y∗
it = xit−1βt + εit (1)
, where xit−1 is a vector of individual and job characteristics in the base year, and the
error term εit is assumed to be normally distributed. The problem is that we do not
observe this notional wage change. Rather than observing ∆y∗
it, we observe a wage change
distribution that is potentially distorted by both measurement errors and downward wage
rigidities. We refer to this distribution as the observed (∆yo
it), and we detail below how
5See Kahn (1997) and Castellanos et al. (2004) for detailed discussion.
6We use the terms DRWR and wage indexation interchangeably. There are important diﬀerences
across countries, but indexation clauses tend to be asymmetric. If inﬂation happens to be above expec-
tations, revision clauses are often in place, but the reverse is not true. See Babecky et al. (2009) for a
discussion.
11it relates to ∆y∗
it.
As we stated, the ﬁrst diﬀerence between observed and notional wage changes is due
to measurement error. The population measurement error is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the observed value, ∆yo
it, and the actual value, ∆yit. Hence, ∆eit = ∆yo
it−∆yit,
where eit is modeled as a normally distributed shock to wage levels. However, not all
observations are subject to measurement error. We assume that with probability qt
wages are correctly measured, and with probability 1−qt, they are measured with error.
The second diﬀerence between observed and notional wage changes is due to the
presence of rigidities in wage setting. Wage changes for the proportion of individuals
subject to DNWR, denoted by pN
t , will be governed by:
∆yo
it =



xit−1βt + εit + ∆eit if xit−1βt + εit ￿ 0
∆eit if xit−1βt + εit < 0



(2)
Thus, for those individuals subject to DNWR, the observed wage change will coincide
with the notional wage change plus some measurement error only when the programmed
wage increase is above zero. Had the ﬂexible wage change been negative, the worker
would receive a wage freeze, and the observed wage change would only diﬀer from zero
if wages were measured with errors.
Similarly, the observed wage changes of the fraction of individuals prone to DRWR,
denoted by pR
t , will instead be given by:
∆yo
it =



xit−1βt + εit + ∆eit if xit−1βt + εit ￿ rit
∆eit + rit if xit−1βt + εit < rit



(3)
, where a straightforward interpretation (but not the only one) of rit is that it represents
individual-speciﬁc inﬂation expectations. Note that, in contrast with DNWR, the focal
point for wage indexation is individual speciﬁc (ri). In the empirical implementation of
the model, we will assume that rit is i.i.d. normal and will allow its mean and variance
to vary over time.
As for the fraction of ﬂexible individuals, denoted by 1 − pN
t − pR
t , their actual
wage changes, ∆yit, are equal to the notional wage changes, ∆y∗
it. Diﬀerences between
12observed and notional wage changes are allowed if measurement error is present: ∆yo
it =
xit−1βt + εit + ∆eit.
It is worth stressing once more that measurement error is not forced onto the data.
Assuming that ∆eit is normally distributed with a positive variance in the population
would imply that the probability of a ﬁrm correctly reporting individual wages would
be zero, a feature most likely inconsistent with the nature of our data. Instead, our
assumption that a fraction, qt, of the wages, is measured without error allows us to
examine the relative importance of this feature in the two data sets we study.
Under these assumptions, the likelihood of each observation is calculated and all pa-
rameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. Intuitively, the estimator uses the local
asymmetries in the wage change distributions that we have discussed in the descriptive
section in order to identify DNWR and DNWR. However, instead of identifying them un-
conditionally, by, for example, visually inspecting the previous histograms, the estimator
exploits the asymmetries in wage changes conditional on individual and job character-
istics. As for the identiﬁcation of potential measurement error, the estimator has two
main features that help assess its relevance. First, since measurement error is expected
to follow a continuous distribution, its presence is less likely when the size of the spike
at zero is large. Second, since measurement error is expected to displace actual wage
freezes, we should observe excess probability mass around zero and relatively smooth
asymmetries in other parts of the wage change distribution when measurement error is
important.
It is important to note that not all forms of measurement error will necessarily result
in an underestimation of DNWR. Most notably, in the presence of rounding errors,
wage freezes would actually be over-represented and not the opposite. For example,
Smith (2000) uses data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and ﬁnds
that self-reported reported wage freezes between two consecutive years are less likely
to happen when individuals double check their pay slip before reporting wages. As a
consequence, measurement of DNWR in the BHPS which does not take into account
rounding errors would tend to over-estimate rigidities. We believe our data are unlikely
to suﬀer from rounding errors since wage information is directly extracted from ﬁrms’
13individual pay records. In the case of Uruguay, the BPS data determine individual
access to pension, health, and other beneﬁts. Hence, it is in the worker’s interest that
all information is accurately reported by the ﬁrm. Moreover, the data are thoroughly
checked by government oﬃcials. In the case of Brazil, wages are also directly extracted
from company records and wage information is requested to the level of centavos (cents).
On average, 75 percent of our wage observations include the cents paid.
Goette et al. (2007) note that their estimator may encounter identiﬁcation problems
when inﬂation is very low, since in that case, DNWR and DRWR are very close in the
wage change distribution and are therefore hard to distinguish. We are rarely constrained
by this issue and are therefore generally able to obtain accurate estimates because, even in
the periods with lowest inﬂation in Brazil and Uruguay, the inﬂation rate was relatively
high with respect to OECD countries previously studied. Also, and in contrast with
previous studies, the rate of inﬂation observed during the period of study in both Uruguay
and Brazil is fairly volatile. It is for this reason that we separately estimate our model
year by year. This allows for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation, wherein both, the parameters of the
notional and the diﬀerent rigidity regimes may vary across years. A potential limitation
of our analysis is that it does not consider the possibility of symmetric rigidities; for
instance, those associated with the menu costs of changing wages. Our assumption is
justiﬁed by the analysis of Dickens et al. (2008), who examines individual wage change
distributions among job stayers in 17 OECD countries and ﬁnds no evidence of menu
costs in wage setting. Given the inﬂation history of the two countries we are studying
and the high volatility of inﬂation during the sample period we believe that menu costs
are even less likely to be relevant in our case.
4 Main Results
4.1 Empirical Implementation
In this section, we discuss some relevant details regarding the empirical implementation
of the model and provide a ﬁrst assessment of its functioning. We estimate an individ-
ual wage change model and the corresponding rigidity parameters year by year. It is
14important to note that, after applying the sample restrictions discussed in section 2, we
do not eliminate any outliers from the sample, neither in wage levels nor in changes. We
let our model of measurement error deal with this problem.
The set of covariates used to estimate the notional wage change distribution varies in
the two countries, reﬂecting diﬀerences in data availability. The Brazilian data are more
comprehensive and allow us to control for gender, age, tenure and their quadratic terms,
educational attainment, occupation and sector of operation, establishment size, type of
labor contract, and location of the ﬁrm (in Belo Horizonte or outside the state capital).
In the case of Uruguay, we control for gender, age, tenure and their quadratic terms,
sector of operation, white or blue collar status, establishment size, and the location of
the ﬁrm (in Montevideo vs. the rest of the country).
Table 2 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the notional wage change equation
parameters and their associated z-statistics for Uruguay and Brazil in 1998-1999.7 The
estimated coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant in almost all cases. Some commonalities
within the two countries emerge. As expected, individual wage growth declines non-
monotonically with age, is higher in the capital, and tends to increase with establishment
size, although wages in medium/large Brazilian establishments (those with the 50 to1,000
employees) display higher wage growth than the largest ﬁrms in the sample (those with
1,000 employees or more). Perhaps surprisingly, the eﬀect of education and type of
contract on individual wage growth in Brazil is not clear, as suggested by inconsistent
signs across years, and often coeﬃcients not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Figure 4 presents the wage changes predicted by the model, as well as the ob-
served wage changes in 1997-1998. Panel A displays the corresponding distributions
for Uruguay and panel B for Brazil. The predicted histogram is obviously smoother, but
the overall ﬁt of the model to the shape of the observed wage growth histogram is quite
good. If anything, the model tends to underestimate the concentration of observations
around the focal points of rigidity. In the case of Uruguay, we slightly underestimate
the spike at zero, and overestimate the share of wage growth observations immediately
7Results for the other years are qualitatively similar to those of 1998-1999, unless otherwise stated in
the text.
15below the focal point of real rigidity. In the case of Brazil, we slightly underestimate
the concentration of observations around the realized rate of inﬂation. Table 3 shows
the median and standard deviations of the observed and estimated distributions in every
year. With very few exceptions, the model ﬁt is very close to the actual summary statis-
tics. We pin down the median and standard deviations with a precision up to the second
decimal.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize some other important parameter estimates from our model,
including the mean wage changes in the observed (∆yo
it) and notional (∆y∗
it) distributions,
the estimated focal point of DRWR, the percentages of workers subject to DNWR
￿
pN
t
￿
and DRWR
￿
pR
t
￿
, and the extent of measurement error in the data (qt). Regarding the
latter, our results indicate that the extent of measurement error in the data is quite stable
over time in both countries. The extent of measurement error estimated by the model
is larger in Brazil, where he average share of correctly reported hourly wage changes
according to the model is 79 percent, against 91 percent in Uruguay.
4.2 DNWR and DRWR
We begin the discussion of our main results by assessing the impact of measurement error
on the shares of nominal wage freezes and cuts. In line with our expectations, the share
of wage cuts declines and the share of wage freezes increases after measurement errors
have been dealt with, as the comparisons plotted in Figures 5 and 6 show for Uruguay
and Brazil, respectively. The average share of wage cuts in the data is quite large: 16
percent in Uruguay and 18 percent in Brazil. However, these shares are almost halved,
to 9 percent in Uruguay and 10 percent in Brazil, when measurement error has been
taken into account. Over time, the share of wage cuts gradually increases in Uruguay
(ﬁgure 5), in accordance with the disinﬂation process. However, the increase in wage cuts
in Uruguay should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of increased wage ﬂexibility,
inasmuch as wage freezes also rise over the same period -a feature consistent with growing
importance of downward nominal wage rigidities. In the data, wage freezes move from
3.6 percent in 1996-1997 to 25 percent in 2002-2003. The raise is even more dramatic
after measurement error has been accounted for, moving from 4.4 percent to 31 percent
16within the same period. In contrast with the case of Uruguay, we do not observe a clear
pattern in the time evolution of wage cuts and freezes in Brazil (ﬁgure 6).
The incidence of the two rigidity regimes in Uruguay clearly illustrates that the
macroeconomic environment plays a crucial role in the determination of wage rigidities,
as highlighted by a clear regime shift in 1999-2000 (ﬁgure 7). In the ﬁst years of our
sample period, DRWR is very important, most likely as a result of a recent history of
high inﬂation and widespread indexation in labor contracts. The share of workers in the
real rigidity regime
￿
pR￿
is 72 percent in 1996-1997 and 88 percent in 1997-1998. As
inﬂation goes down, however, real rigidity rapidly declines. In 1998-1999, the share of
workers subject to the real rigidity regime is 65 percent; this plummets to 12 percent
the next year, and remains relatively stable below 8 percent, for the remainder of the
period.
The shift away from DRWR as inﬂation declines in Uruguay is accompanied by a
sharp rise in DNWR. During the ﬁrst two years of wage changes, DNWR is very low
according to our estimates: the fraction of workers subject to DNWR is just 12 percent.
After a mild increase in 1998-1999, DNWR jumps to a new equilibrium in 1999-2000,
when the share of workers subject to DNWR stabilizes at around 65 for the remainder of
the period. However, the relationship between the two types of rigidities and inﬂation is
more complex than one might initially suspect. When inﬂation peaks again in 2001-2002
and 2002-2003, the share of workers subject to DRWR remains low, while DNWR is still
binding for a majority of the labor force (pN
2001−2002 = 62% and pN
2002−2003 = 78%). Note
that this is the same period in which the share of both wage cuts and freezes grows
sharply in Uruguay. The rationale for this behavior must be found in the severe recession
in Uruguay during these years. Uruguay enters into a long recession in 1998Q4 which
reaches its trough in 2002Q3, after a temporary upswing between 2000Q2 and 2001Q3.8
In 2002, the severe crisis that aﬀected the economy forced the central bank to let the
exchange rate ﬂoat freely, putting an end to the use of the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor. Hence, even in the presence of high inﬂation during these years, ﬁrms are in
8Peaks and troughs are identiﬁed using the Bry-Boschan quarterly (BBQ) algorithm (Harding and
Pagan, 2002) on quarterly real GDP data for the period 1988Q1-2010Q3.
17need of downward wage adjustments. Perhaps more importantly, 2003-2004 is a year of
very strong recovery in economic activity (real GDP growth is 12 percent) and relatively
high inﬂation (9 percent). Even in this context wage indexation does not reappears, and
DNWR remaining as the only noticeable friction in wage setting (pN
2003−2004 = 78% and
pR
2003−2004 = 4%).
The results in Brazil are in sharp contrast with those of Uruguay. The ﬁrst important
diﬀerence is that DWNR is of second order importance in Brazil, while, as table 5
indicates, there is a greater degree of DRWR. The importance of wage indexation remains
relatively stable throughout our sample period. On average, 43 percent of the formal
workforce in Brazil is subject to DRWR, while 10 percent is subject to DNWR. During
the ﬁrst half of the sample period, the share of workers whose wage are governed by the
DRWR regime slowly declines, from 48 percent in 1995-1996 to 31 percent in 1998-1999.
In 1999-2000, there is a rapid raise in DRWR, with pR reaching its maximum at 66
percent, but this is rapidly reversed in 2000-2001, when real rigidity declines again. We
will come back to this rapid reversal when we discuss, below, the role of the estimated
focal point in wage negotiations. As for DNWR, it only becomes a relevant feature of
wage setting in 2000-2001, where pN is estimated to be equal to 35 percent, compared
to 8 percent in the previous period.
4.3 Monetary Policy Regime and the Indexation of Wages
The stability of wage indexation in Brazil hides an important regime change. Figure 8
shows the evolution of our estimated focal point of DRWR (rit) and its variance, together
with the CPI inﬂation rate and the increase in the minimum wage. In the ﬁrst years
of our sample period ri traces the increase in the minimum wage almost perfectly. The
importance of the minimum wage is so powerful as a focal point of wage negotiations
that the estimated bounds around ri, as measured by its variance, are virtually zero. It
is only starting in 1999-2000 that our estimate of ri follows the rate of inﬂation and not
the growth of the minimum wage. Incidentally, this is the year in which the Brazilian
central bank introduced inﬂation targeting. The movement away from the minimum
wage as the sole price index in wage negotiations, and towards expected inﬂation, speaks
18in favor of the role of inﬂation targeting in anchoring inﬂation expectations.
Interestingly, after the introduction of inﬂation targeting, the conﬁdence bands around
ri widen. A plausible interpretation of the increase in the bands around ri is that they
illustrate the dispersion in inﬂation expectations across agents. Indeed, after 1999-2000
our estimator centers the focal point of wage negotiations or the price index used for
wage indexation at the realized rate of inﬂation, reinforcing this interpretation. How-
ever the increase in the variance of ri allows indexation to be driven by both distortions
around the rate of inﬂation, and distortions associated with the increase of the minimum
wage. The growth of the minimum wage falls outside the estimated range of ri only in
2000-01, a year in which wage rigidities are narrowly pegged to the inﬂation rate. It
is probably for this reason that we fail to capture the full picture of real rigidity this
year, as illustrated by the rapid drop in the share of workers subject to DRWR and the
corresponding wage sweep up.
In contrast with Brazil, the focal point of DRWR in Uruguay (ﬁgure 9) is never
related to changes in the minimum wage. During the ﬁrst three years of the sample,
when indexation is high, ri appears to trace movements of the inﬂation rate, although
the standard deviation is quite large, in the range of 3 orders of magnitude with respect
to the post-inﬂation targeting period in Brazil. The rest of the period is characterized
by a low incidence of wage indexation, and hence the focal point of DRWR bears less
relevance.
The contrast in the focal point of wage negotiations between the two countries il-
lustrates two approaches to dealing with the considerable uncertainty associated with a
fairly high and volatile inﬂation environment. In Brazil, during the years that followed
the stabilization plan, the great uncertainty regarding inﬂation arguably forced agents
to index wages to changes in the minimum wage. The introduction of a credible inﬂa-
tion target in 1999 had a clear anchoring eﬀect. Some agents changed their focus in
the wage negotiations to expected inﬂation. The credibility of the target rate can be
seen by the progressive narrowing of the bands around ri. In Uruguay, the stabilization
plan is introduced earlier, in 1991, and is followed by a gradual but steady reduction in
inﬂation, although inﬂation remains fairly volatile during the sample period. Not having
19a meaningful price index to which to anchor their expectations, economic agents index
their wages to their forecasts of inﬂation, which are fairly disperse.
5 Worker and Firm Heterogeneity
Wage setting theories provide diﬀerent predictions regarding the expected incidence of
wage rigidity across types of workers and ﬁrms. In this section, we examine how the esti-
mated individual probabilities of being subject to each type of rigidity vary with worker
and ﬁrm characteristics, in an attempt to shed some further light on the functioning of
labor markets in the two countries.
5.1 Brief Theoretical Discussion
Eﬃciency wage considerations of various kinds have been put forward to explain why
ﬁrms might be reluctant to cut wages. If wage rigidities arise in order to limit worker
shirking behavior (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), or as a result of a ﬁrm’s gift in exchange
for higher worker eﬀort (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), the wages of a ﬁrm’s core workers
should be more protected from nominal or real wage cuts. Since the eﬀort of white collar
workers is both more diﬃcult to monitor and most likely of higher importance for the
productivity of the ﬁrm, these theories predict that the wages of white collar workers
should be more rigid. An additional prediction of the shirking model is that wages
would tend to be more rigid in larger ﬁrms, where monitoring is more costly. A similar
prediction of higher rigidity for white collar workers would be obtained if eﬃciency wages
are paid in order to detract from costly turnover (Stiglitz, 1974), as white collar workers
are more diﬃcult and expensive to replace. Additionally, this model would predict wage
rigidity to be higher among younger workers, as their turnover rate tends to be higher.
Insider-outsider theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) also predict higher wage rigid-
ity for white collars, but in contrast with the turnover model, these theories predict
more rigidity for older, prime-aged workers. Additionally, wage rigidity should be higher
among workers with permanent contracts and workers with higher tenure, as they rep-
resent the primary workforce. A similar prediction would be obtained regarding tenure
20if tenure were a proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, which is costly to replace. The
importance of insider-outsider considerations is inﬂuenced by the institutional environ-
ment. As Holden (2004) shows, DNWR arises endogenously when wage contracts can
only be changed by mutual consent. In this context, union bargaining power and em-
ployment protection provisions are likely to strengthen the power of insiders to prevent
wage cuts.
5.2 Measurement: The Individual Incidence of Rigidities
Our model classiﬁes individuals as belonging to one of three diﬀerent regimes: DNWR,
DRWR or ﬂexible wages. Having discussed, in the previous section, the estimated shares
of individuals in the two rigidity regimes throughout our sample period, we now discuss
now the actual incidence of DNWR and DRWR, which depends on individual charac-
teristics and the macroeconomic environment that governs wage setting. Intuitively, in
a high-growth environment DNWR is less likely to be binding; i.e., ﬁrms are expected
to require fewer wage cuts, so even those workers who are potentially subject to DNWR
￿
pN￿
are likely to receive wage increases in accordance with their notional wage growth.
Similarly, even if highly productive individuals belong to the DNWR regime, the proba-
bility of this regime being binding, i.e., the probability that their notional wage change
falls below 0, should be low.
Denoting the macroeconomic environment by Mt and a set of observable worker and
ﬁrm characteristics by Xit, we can deﬁne pN
it(Xit,Mt) and pR
it(Xit,Mt) as the individual
probabilities of being subject to DNWR and DRWR, respectively in year t:
pN
it(Xit,Mt) = E
￿
∆y∗
it < 0|p
j
it = pN
t
￿
pR
it(Xit,Mt) = E
￿
∆y∗
it < rit|p
j
it = pR
t
￿
Our purpose is to describe the diﬀerences across types of workers and ﬁrms in their
exposure to both types of rigidities, not to estimate underlying parameters of the models
discussed above. Since some of these characteristics are correlated among one another,
we prefer to present diﬀerences conditional on covariates rather than simpler diﬀerences
21in means. Our estimated models include all the covariates used to estimate the notional
wage distribution, as described in section 4.1, and two additional sets of dummy variables.
Since we now pool all years in the estimation, we include time dummies to capture any
macroeconomic eﬀects associated with wage rigidities. Additionally, we include four
indicator variables to capture the quartile distribution of worker wage levels on in the
base year. Note that DNWR is, in principle, related to the expected wage growth of
individuals, but not their wage levels. In contrast, to the extent that DRWR is related
to increases in the minimum wage, as seems to be the case in the ﬁrst years of the
sample in Brazil, its eﬀects are expected to be more visible for low-earning workers.
However, wage indexation associated with the minimum wage often extends beyond
those workers strictly earning the minimum -the so-called numeraire eﬀect (Cunningham,
2007). Moreover, both DNWR and DRWR associated with price changes are more likely
to be binding for high-wage workers if insider-outsider mechanisms are at play.
5.3 Results
Tables 6 and 7 show OLS regressions of the probability of being subject to each type of
rigidity as a function of worker and ﬁrm characteristics in Uruguay and Brazil, respec-
tively. In both countries, wage rigidity rises with age and tenure at a decreasing rate,
over the study period, as evidenced by the positive signs of the main eﬀects and negative
signs of the quadratic terms. Comparing a 50-year-old worker with a worker aged 25,
the estimated probability of being subject to DNWR (DRWR) increases by 0.5pp (2pp)
in Brazil, and by 0.7pp (2.7pp) in Uruguay. The estimated results for tenure are similar
across both types of rigidities in the two countries, suggesting a diﬀerence between a
worker with 15 years of tenure in a ﬁrm and one with 5 years of tenure in the range
from 0.9 to 1.6pp. Both of these features are in line with insider-outsider considerations.
This evidence appears in contrast to previous evidence for the US, where in a survey of
ﬁrm managers, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) ﬁnd strong support for explanations of
DNWR based on eﬃciency wage considerations and adverse selection, but little evidence
in favor of the insider-outsider theory. Interestingly, gender, education, and type of con-
tract seem to have little impact on the probability of being subject to either type of
22rigidity, as suggested by the small magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients. In Uruguay,
white collar workers are more likely to be subject to DNWR, in line with most of the
models discussed in this section. In contrast, occupational dummies in the case of Brazil
all have very small eﬀects.
There is a strong negative association between establishment size and the probability
of being subject to either form of rigidity. In Uruguay, the smallest establishments present
a probability of being subject to DRWR (DRWR) that is 6.7pp (11pp) larger than the
reference category (establishments with more than a 1,000 employees). In Brazil, size
eﬀects in the case of DNWR are of fairly small magnitude. In contrast, the likelihood
that a worker’s wage is subject to DRWR in the lowest size group is about 6.5pp lower
than if that worker is employed in one of the largest ﬁrms in the sample. This evidence
appears to be against shirking models of eﬃciency wages, but is in line with estimates of
DRWR in Belgium reported in Du Caju et al. (2007) and with the greater ﬂexibility in
compensation policies of larger ﬁrms found in surveys of wage setters in European ﬁrms
(Babecký et al., 2009).
As expected, the wage level in the base year, as measured by the three wage quartile
dummies, has little impact on the probability of being subject to DNWR. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, however, we also ﬁnd very little impact of the wage quartile dummies in the
case of DRWR in Brazil, where a concentration of rigidity across low-earning individuals
might have been expected, given the importance of the minimum wage. The main ratio-
nale for this result lies in the fact that some of the covariates included in the regression,
most notably age, education, and occupation dummies, are capturing the wage level of
workers. An unconditional regression of the incidence of DRWR on the quartile dummies
yields a highly signiﬁcant and sizable negative association: workers whose wage level is in
the fourth quartile have a probability of being subject to DRWR that is 3.6pp lower than
workers earning wages in the ﬁrst quartile. If we concentrate on the pre-1999 sample, the
period where the focal point of DRWR coincides with the growth of the minimum wage,
this diﬀerence increases to 5.8pp. As before, similar unconditional regressions show no
observable diﬀerences in DNWR across wage quartiles.
In the case of Brazil, we take advantage of the fact that we observe every formal
23worker employed by each of the establishments in the census to repeat the estimation,
controlling for establishment by time ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, we are eﬀectively comparing
workers employed in the same ﬁrm and year to identify the eﬀect of covariates on the
incidence of each type of rigidity. This should take care of the possibility that some of
our results may be driven by worker selection into diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, depending on
the degree of wage rigidity operating. The results, reported in table 8, are qualitatively
similar to those previously discussed, which suggests that the diﬀerences across workers
highlighted here are not driven by worker sorting and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
6 Conclusions
Emerging countries have moved from high inﬂation regimes in the 1980s to relatively
low and stable inﬂation rates since the second half of the 1990s. This paper assesses how
this disinﬂation process has shaped wage setting in two of these emerging economies:
Brazil and Uruguay. This investigation is important from a policy perspective. The
natural response of wage setters to high inﬂation regimes is wage indexation. This form
of wage rigidity is likely to translate into ineﬃcient allocations, as relative wages are
not allowed to adjust to ﬁrms’ productivity developments. These eﬃciency losses are, in
turn, likely to result in lower levels of welfare and higher unemployment. Hence, from
both a macro and labor economics perspective, it is important to know how downward
real wage rigidities have evolved as inﬂation has fallen.
Measuring downward wage rigidities at the individual level imposes serious data
requirements. In this paper, we have measured the incidence and nature of wage rigidities
in Brazil and Uruguay using high quality administrative data, but it is still possible that
measurement error might result in an underestimation of downward wage rigidities. Our
model helps to deal with this possible bias by jointly estimating the parameters governing
measurement error and the diﬀerent types of rigidities we are considering. The model
contrasts the individual wage changes observed in the data with a notional wage change,
which is the wage change that would have prevailed in the absence of wage rigidities.
Importantly, we take advantage of the richness of our administrative data sets to estimate
24this notional wage change distribution year by year as a function of individual and ﬁrm
characteristics.
Our analysis uncovers several important ﬁndings. First, although a non-trivial share
of individuals experiences wage cuts in emerging countries, there is substantial evidence
of wage rigidity, either in the form of resistance to nominal wage cuts, or in the form
of wage indexation. Second, the nature of wage rigidities is quite diﬀerent in Brazil
and Uruguay. Downward nominal wage rigidity is virtually nonexistent in Brazil, but as
inﬂation lowers it becomes very important in Uruguay, aﬀecting more than 70 percent
of the workforce by the end of the sample period.
Our third ﬁnding is potentially important for the modeling of wage setting. We
ﬁnd that the nature of wage rigidities changes dramatically in response to changes in
the macro and policy environment. Hence, the two cases we study challenge the view
that wage rigidities in the labor market are structural in the sense of Lucas (1976).
In Uruguay, downward real wage rigidities in the ﬁrst years of the sample are rapidly
transformed into resistance to nominal wage cuts. Hence, the disinﬂation process had
a positive impact on breaking with indexation. In Brazil, wage indexation is important
and highly persistent, but the introduction of inﬂation targeting by the central bank in
1999 shifts the focal point of wage negotiations. During the ﬁrst years of analysis, wage
indexation is pegged to the growth of the minimum wage. After 1999, workers and ﬁrms
start centering wage negotiations on the expected rate of inﬂation.
The reasons for the decline of wage indexation in Uruguay, and the persistence of the
same phenomenon in Brazil remain issues for future research. As a point of departure,
these patterns appear to be consistent with the diﬀerent trends of unionization in the
two countries over the same period. While we observe a decline in union density and
a strong movement towards decentralization in wage negotiations in Uruguay, union
coverage remains fairly high and stable in Brazil.
Theories of wage rigidity based on insider-outsider considerations predict that the
wages of blue collars, young workers and workers with lower tenure exhibit less rigidity
than primary workers, who have greater bargaining power to exert against wage cuts.
Our results conﬁrm these predictions and thus lend support to these theories.
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Figure 1: The evolution of inﬂation in Brazil and Uruguay. 1995-2005
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Figure 2: Histograms of Observed Log Hourly Wage Changes. Double-digit Inﬂation
Years
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Figure 3: Histograms of Observed Log Hourly Wage Changes. Single-digit Inﬂation
Years
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Figure 4: Observed vs. Predicted Log Hourly Wage Changes. 1997-1998
Figure 5: Wage Cuts and Freezes in Uruguay. The Impact of Measurement Error
32Figure 6: Wage Cuts and Freezes in Brazil. The Impact of Measurement Error
Figure 7: Rigidity Regimes and the Rate of Inﬂation in Uruguay
33Figure 8: Estimated Focal Point of DRWR and the Rate of Inﬂation. Brazil
Figure 9: Estimated Focal Point of DRWR and the Rate of Inﬂation. Uruguay
34Table 1: Summary Statistics. Belo Horizonte vs. Other Urban Areas. 1995-2000
Belo Horizonte Other Urban Areas
(Averages)
Age 33.7 35.4
Share of males 47.7% 46.9%
Share of Formal Workers 63.6% 63.9%
Years of education
< 1 5.6% 6.1%
1 to 3 13.3% 12.1%
4 to 7 40.8% 36.0%
8 to 10 16.7% 18.2%
11 or more 23.7% 27.6%
Sector of Economic Activity
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.9% 0.5%
Fishing 0.0% 0.1%
Mining and quarrying 0.6% 0.1%
Industry 16.1% 17.9%
Electricity, Gas and Water 1.0% 0.9%
Construction 9.5% 6.6%
Commerce 14.6% 15.8%
Hotels and restaurants 4.9% 5.2%
Transport 5.8% 6.0%
Financial intermediation 1.7% 2.5%
Real state, renting and related 0.8% 1.0%
Public administration and defense 4.7% 5.2%
Education 5.9% 5.7%
Health and social work 6.6% 6.9%
Other social activities 26.9% 25.7%
Extra territorial organizations 0.0% 0.0%
35Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates. Notional Wage Growth. 1998-1999
Uruguay Brazil
Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z
Age -0.004∗∗∗ -6.96 -0.001∗∗∗ -7.94
Age2/1000 0.032∗∗∗ 4.61 0.002∗∗∗ 4.33
Male 0.006∗∗∗ 3.10 -0.001∗∗∗ -3.83
Tenure in months -0.001∗∗∗ -13.22 0.000∗∗∗ 4.94
(Tenure in months)2/1000 0.001∗∗∗ 7.74 -0.000∗∗∗ -2.75
Establishment size:
0-5 employees -0.116∗∗∗ -23.55 -0.011∗∗∗ -26.08
5-15 employees -0.091∗∗∗ -20.31 -0.007∗∗∗ -18.57
15-30 employees -0.082∗∗∗ -16.95 -0.005∗∗∗ -11.56
30-50 employees -0.047∗∗∗ -9.63 -0.001∗∗∗ -1.28
50-100 employees -0.018∗∗∗ -4.17 0.004∗∗∗ 9.28
100-200 employees -0.022∗∗∗ -4.68 0.004∗∗∗ 9.69
200-500 employees -0.033∗∗∗ -7.30 0.005∗∗∗ 13.28
500-1000 employees -0.009∗∗ -2.14 0.009∗∗∗ 18.90
Montevideo 0.009∗∗∗ 4.00 - -
Belo Horizonte - - 0.004∗∗∗ 18.23
White collar worker 0.008∗∗ 2.41 - -
Occupation dummies - - yes
Temporary contract - - -0.002 -1.46
Education:
Primary - - -0.001∗∗∗ -3.81
Secondary - - 0.000 0.06
N. Obs. 71,539 1,005,791
Note: The reference groups for establishment size and education are more than 1000 employees
and tertiary education, respectively. Additional control variables are 9 sector dummies for Uruguay
and 14 sector dummies and 9 occupation dummies for Brazil. Levels of statistical signiﬁcance: ***
denotes signiﬁcance at the 1-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and * at the 10-percent level.
36Table 3: Observed vs. Simulated Wage Change Distributions
Actual wage growth Simulated wage growth
Median Sd. Dev. Median Sd. Dev.
Year Uruguay
1996-1997 0.175 0.334 0.176 0.308
1997-1998 0.113 0.197 0.116 0.198
1998-1999 0.068 0.294 0.068 0.276
1999-2000 0.033 0.300 0.033 0.271
2000-2001 0.025 0.319 0.019 0.287
2001-2002 0.004 0.340 0.005 0.316
2002-2003 0.010 0.260 0.018 0.244
2003-2004 0.057 0.264 0.054 0.248
Brazil
1995-1996 0.134 0.292 0.140 0.287
1996-1997 0.077 0.282 0.075 0.274
1997-1998 0.055 0.265 0.052 0.254
1998-1999 0.045 0.281 0.045 0.262
1999-2000 0.094 0.267 0.090 0.263
2000-2001 0.100 0.248 0.101 0.240
2001-2002 0.104 0.248 0.103 0.243
Table 4: Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity in Uruguay. Parameter Estimates
Year ∆yi ∆y∗
i ri pR pN q N
1996-1997 0.182 0.072 0.160 0.722 0.117 0.952 52,222
1997-1998 0.120 -0.064 0.105 0.882 0.118 0.876 70,254
1998-1999 0.069 -0.018 0.063 0.651 0.183 0.933 71,556
1999-2000 0.036 0.024 0.178 0.122 0.613 0.898 69,352
2000-2001 0.015 0.014 0.207 0.067 0.620 0.899 68,149
2001-2002 -0.016 -0.001 0.164 0.080 0.624 0.865 66,525
2002-2003 0.041 0.009 0.248 0.072 0.678 0.907 63,996
2003-2004 0.088 0.0490 0.084 0.044 0.750 0.923 63,497
Note:This table displays the mean wage changes in the observed (∆yi) and notional (∆y
∗
i ) distrib-
utions, the estimated focal point of DRWR (ri), the percentages of workers in the DRWR (p
R) and
DWNR (p
N) regimes, the share of wage change observations observed without error (q ) and the
number of observations (N) for each period.
37Table 5: Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity in Brazil. Parameter Estimates
Year ∆yi ∆y∗
i ri pR pN q N
1995-1996 0.174 0.136 0.113 0.457 0.009 0.781 849,004
1996-1997 0.122 0.074 0.069 0.493 0.026 0.702 896,797
1997-1998 0.065 0.032 0.080 0.306 0.041 0.688 985,980
1998-1999 0.078 0.040 0.045 0.312 0.091 0.742 1,005,791
1999-2000 0.113 0.007 0.078 0.659 0.082 0.937 1,042,319
2000-2001 0.126 0.101 0.056 0.271 0.351 0.793 1,085,804
2001-2002 0.126 0.064 0.099 0.530 0.093 0.890 1,199,888
Note:This table displays the mean wage changes in the observed (∆yi) and notional (∆y
∗
i ) distrib-
utions, the estimated focal point of DRWR (ri), the percentages of workers in the DRWR (p
R) and
DWNR (p
N) regimes, the share of wage change observations observed without error (q ) and the
number of observations (N) for each period.
38Table 6: The incidence of wage rigidity in Uruguay. Worker and Firm Characteristics
Real Rigidity Nominal Rigidity
Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t
Age 0.296∗∗∗ 20.12 0.078∗∗∗ 6.27
Age2/1000 -2.540∗∗∗ -14.34 -0.703∗∗∗ -4.54
Male -0.228∗∗∗ -5.14 -0.155∗∗∗ -3.99
Tenure in months 0.022∗∗∗ 25.26 0.005∗∗∗ 8.96
(Tenure in months)2/1000 -0.036∗∗∗ -15.01 0.001 0.86
Establishment size:
0-5 employees 6.715∗∗∗ 58.42 10.869∗∗∗ 133.16
5-15 employees 5.551∗∗∗ 51.78 12.125∗∗∗ 147.31
15-30 employees 3.708∗∗∗ 34.55 9.719∗∗∗ 124.30
30-50 employees 1.487∗∗∗ 13.25 6.293∗∗∗ 91.50
50-100 employees 0.021 0.17 3.151∗∗∗ 41.53
100-200 employees 0.671∗∗∗ 5.55 0.836∗∗∗ 8.15
200-500 employees 0.129 1.09 0.722∗∗∗ 7.95
500-1000 employees -0.415∗∗∗ -3.34 0.683∗∗∗ 7.89
Montevideo -0.980∗∗∗ -20.75 0.699∗∗∗ 15.34
White Collar Worker 0.117∗ 1.62 1.676∗∗∗ 21.70
Wage quartile
Quartile 2 0.008 0.13 0.043 0.64
Quartile 3 -0.098 -1.26 0.199∗∗∗ 2.85
Quartile 4 0.115 1.37 0.054 0.68
N. Obs. 525,551 525,551
Note: The reference groups for establishment size and wage quartile are more than 1000 employees
and quartile 4, respectively. Additional control variables are year dummies and 9 sector dummies.
Levels of statistical signiﬁcance: *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1-percent level; ** at the 5-percent
level; and * at the 10-percent level. T-statistics are clustered by individual.
39Table 7: The incidence of wage rigidity in Brazil. Worker and Firm Characteristics
Real Rigidity Nominal Rigidity
Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t
Age 0.182∗∗∗ 189.85 0.049∗∗∗ 279.41
Age2/1000 -1.317∗∗∗ -102.33 -0.425∗∗∗ -178.89
Male -0.575∗∗∗ -157.07 -0.101∗∗∗ -140.70
Tenure in months 0.029∗∗∗ 309.77 0.005∗∗∗ 304.90
(Tenure in months)2/1000 -0.072∗∗∗ -171.48 -0.011∗∗∗ -158.67
Establishment size:
0-5 employees 6.464∗∗∗ 758.57 0.216∗∗∗ 133.39
5-15 employees 4.146∗∗∗ 515.09 -0.054∗∗∗ -34.43
15-30 employees 2.725∗∗∗ 332.97 -0.178∗∗∗ -109.85
30-50 employees 1.740∗∗∗ 204.33 -0.253∗∗∗ -148.10
50-100 employees 0.771∗∗∗ 96.21 -0.291∗∗∗ -181.08
100-200 employees -0.047∗∗∗ -5.65 -0.244∗∗∗ -139.41
200-500 employees -0.114∗∗∗ -14.29 -0.183∗∗∗ -111.61
500-1000 employees -0.225∗∗∗ -24.04 -0.138∗∗∗ -66.70
Belo Horizonte -1.514∗∗∗ -380.79 0.228∗∗∗ 281.71
Occupation Dummies yes yes
Education:
Primary 0.139∗∗∗ 18.70 -0.088∗∗∗ -48.50
Secondary -0.459∗∗∗ -64.25 -0.165∗∗∗ -91.28
Temporary contract -0.006 -0.19 -0.304∗∗∗ -52.46
Wage quartile:
Quartile 2 -0.134∗∗∗ -26.00 -0.031∗∗∗ -33.11
Quartile 3 -0.063∗∗∗ -12.16 -0.008∗∗∗ -8.83
Quartile 4 -0.050∗∗∗ -8.56 0.020∗∗∗ 17.66
N. Obs. 7,065,583 7,065,583
Note: The reference groups for establishment size and education are more than 1000 employees
and tertiary education, respectively. Additional control variables are year dummies, 14 sector
dummies and 9 occupation dummies. Levels of statistical signiﬁcance: *** denotes signiﬁcance at
the 1-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and * at the 10-percent level. Levels of statistical
signiﬁcance: *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and * at the
10-percent level. T-statistics are clustered by individual.
40Table 8: The incidence of wage rigidity in Brazil. Within Establishment Estimates
Real Rigidity Nominal Rigidity
Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t
Age 0.178∗∗∗ 494.20 0.048∗∗∗ 473.83
Age2/1000 -1.233∗∗∗ -261.91 -0.409∗∗∗ -307.25
Male -0.648∗∗∗ -368.80 -0.110∗∗∗ -221.14
Tenure in months 0.029∗∗∗ 1006.35 0.005∗∗∗ 597.55
(Tenure in months)2/1000 -0.071∗∗∗ -666.76 -0.010∗∗∗ -361.27
Occupation Dummies yes yes
Education:
Primary 0.285∗∗∗ 85.09 -0.062∗∗∗ -66.30
Secondary -0.427∗∗∗ -135.39 -0.137∗∗∗ -154.01
Temporary contract 0.421∗∗∗ 34.92 -0.183∗∗∗ -53.78
Wage quartile:
Quartile 2 0.010∗∗∗ 3.96 0.002∗∗∗ 2.59
Quartile 3 0.039∗∗∗ 13.84 0.006∗∗∗ 8.14
Quartile 4 0.100∗∗∗ 31.03 0.034∗∗∗ 37.48
N. Obs. 7,065,583 7,065,583
Note: The reference group for education is tertiary education. The regressions include establishment
by year ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional control variables are 9 occupation dummies. Levels of statistical
signiﬁcance: *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and * at the
10-percent level.
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